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THE PERSPECTIVE OF LAW ON CONTRACT
Aditi Bagchi *
INTRODUCTION
Contract is an essential component of the first-year curriculum in
American law schools. But law students do not all take the same course
in contracts. More so than in countries where students in different
classes, even universities, are given common examinations, American
law students draw something of a lottery in their assignment to particular
law professors.
The aspects of that lottery most immediately salient to law students
may concern the pedagogical style and personality of their professors.
But arguably more important, even than the subject matter covered by a
particular course, is the picture of contract and contract law offered to
students. Although students have their own direct experiences with
contract, they might plausibly take their first-year course to present the
definitive legal perspective on contract.
What is the perspective of law on contract? This Article will consider
two dimensions of the perspective we offer students. Part I will consider
how we present the nature of contract law. That is, it will explore the
extent to which traditional methods of teaching unduly underplay
indeterminacy and disagreement. In that Part I distinguish between
inductive and deductive legal reasoning and suggest we may give short
shrift to the former in teaching. Part II will consider the attitude of the
law toward contract as a social practice. Here I distinguish between
internal and external perspectives on law and suggest that many
professors may be inclined to systematically favor one perspective over
the other. We should strive to help students integrate those perspectives.
I.

INDUCTIVE AND DEDUCTIVE REASONING IN CONTRACT
LAW
Traditional contract courses emphasize doctrine. More rigorous

* Many thanks to Larry Cunningham and the editors of this journal for inviting me to participate in
this symposium.
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variants of doctrinally focused classes may emphasize logical continuity
between doctrines. They might tease out underlying principles of
contract to which the law appears committed, whether it be the
requirement of agreement or the objective character of agreement, and
demonstrate how those principles play out in one area after the other. In
showing contract law to be more than an ensemble of isolated legal rules
pertaining to the enforcement of agreement, a “cohesion” approach
illuminates how rules hang (or fall) together, their common
presuppositions as well as their tensions.
Presenting contract law as a body of law that aspires to regulate
exchange in a consistent way reveals law at its best. The idea that rules
constrain or direct—even if they do not fully determine—the ways in
which powerful actors in our legal order adjudicate disputes between
private persons who find themselves at the mercy of a court is the
essence of the rule of law. If contract professors can show how the rule
of law operates in an area so fundamental to commercial exchange and
social order, we will have imparted something important to not only the
practice of law but also the professional identity of budding lawyers.
The cohesion approach, which is doctrinal teaching at its best,
proceeds by working through a set of classic and a few contemporary
cases, each of which stands in for some doctrine or doctrinal
development. The cases selected for students are usually ones that come
closest to articulating key principles expressly. 1 If the rules amount to a
three-part test, then all the better. Sometimes selected cases also (or
instead) offer the most elaborate justification for the related legal rule 2 or
the most detailed and systematic application of it. 3 Sometimes they have
especially compelling facts that demonstrate either the suitability or
limits of the rule. 4 Casebook authors appear to apply similar criteria
because we see the same cases in numerous casebooks. 5
1. For example, most casebooks use Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898), to illustrate
promissory estoppel, and Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 133 N.W.2d 267 (Wis. 1965), to
illustrate the possibility of pre-contractual promissory estoppel.
2. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965)
(discussing unconscionability).
3. See, e.g., Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116 (S.D.N.Y.
1960) (interpreting ambiguous term).
4. See, for example, the oft-used Raffles v. Wichelhaus, (1864) 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Exch.); 2
Hurl. & C. 906, to illustrate failure of agreement, and Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919 (Mich.
1887), to illustrate mutual mistake.
5. Each of the cases cited above, supra notes 1–4, appears in IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS,
STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW (8th ed. 2012); RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS: CASES AND
DOCTRINE (4th ed. 2008); LON L. FULLER, MELVIN ARON EISENBERG & MARK GERGEN, BASIC
CONTRACT LAW (9th ed. 2013); FRIEDRICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
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Although the thrust of this Article is to emphasize differences in the
perspective on contract we offer students, what standardization we do
see in classrooms results from the convenience of assigning casebooks
that have preselected a set of cases, a set that is, again, substantially
overlapping across casebooks. Those cases amount to a canon that even
seasoned practitioners might refer to as representative of certain key
legal rules. For example, one might long refer to the Hadley principle (of
Hadley v. Baxendale 6) to stand in for the idea that damages are limited
to those foreseeable to the other party, or to Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon 7 for the idea that a duty of good faith will be implied to cure
apparent lack of mutuality in an agreement that was intended to be
enforceable.
A common canon has advantages and disadvantages. From a
pragmatic standpoint, it must be reassuring to law students that their
grasp of the essential rules is not entirely contingent on the
idiosyncrasies of their professors, especially as our idiosyncrasies are
often rather apparent and not always reassuring on their face. It is also
useful for attorneys to have a shorthand and common reference for
fundamental rules. The common law is more common if students from
law schools in different states, studying under professors with various
priorities, come away with a common understanding of the most
important rules and even the most important justifications offered for
them. We cannot speak of an internal point of view 8 if there is no
common perspective shared by participants in the legal system. Without
such an internal point of view, the cohesion and doctrinal unity that we
might aspire to impart to students would be an illusion.
A legal canon comes with costs, however, just as there are costs to a
literary canon, philosophical canon, or to a single history of any
development or event. 9 First, legal rules are indeterminate. Law students
often resist indeterminacy, and depending on the perceived authority of
their professor, may attribute the indeterminacy of her answers to reflect
only her own uncertainty. In fact, indeterminacy is an essential feature of
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1986).
6. (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145; 9 Ex. 341.
7. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
8. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79–88 (Penelope A. Bulloch & Joseph Raz eds.,
Clarendon Press 2d ed. 1994) (1961) (introducing the idea of an internal point of view in law).
9. For problems with a literary canon, see LEE MORRISSEY, DEBATING THE CANON: A READER
FROM ADDISON TO NAFISI (2005). For problems with a philosophical canon, see FEMINIST
REFLECTIONS ON THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY (Lilli Alanen & Charlotte Witt eds., 2004) and
PHILOSOPHY IN HISTORY: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORIOGRAPHY OF PHILOSOPHY (Richard Rorty et al.
eds., 1984).
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law generally—perhaps universally 10—but at least of the common law. 11
The indeterminate application of legal rules and precedent to individual
cases creates the space in which those rules evolve, and in which justice
can be done for particular litigants whose facts depart from precedent in
ways for which any formal articulation of the rule will not take adequate
account.
There are a number of obvious ways in which we might attempt to
impart the fact of indeterminacy to students. We might give them cases
and ask them to apply them to facts and show that they and their peers
arrive at radically different results, thus illustrating a simple feature of
how the mind works. Or we might present them with apparently
contradictory cases, as we often do in certain areas. For example, Hill v.
Gateway 12 and Klocek v. Gateway 13 neatly show how very smart judges
construct offer and acceptance differently on very similar facts.
Jurisdictional differences, such as those that surround the parol evidence
rule or the plain meaning/contextualist rules on extrinsic evidence, begin
with judges diverging at some point. 14 The cases in which they selfconsciously turn—often while emphasizing continuity—reveal the
multiple paths available to that court under existing precedent.
But another important way in which the fact of indeterminacy is
revealed to students, and remains salient to lawyers throughout their
careers, is the fact of perpetual disagreement about law and its
application. To the extent lawyers refer to a canon that inevitably reflects
one strand of law, albeit a dominant one, we artificially stifle genuine
disagreement about the state of the law, its reasoning, and its merits.
Even if it turns out that all things considered we benefit from a
common core of cases that most students read, there is a more
substantial pedagogical loss to presenting these cases to students in a
pre-selected fashion. The method inherently favors the deductive aspect
of legal thinking. We deduce the appropriate disposition of a case from
legal rules when we invoke a general rule and apply that rule directly to
10. See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 166 (1999); Mark Tushnet,
Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 339 (1996).
11. See, e.g., G.W.F. HEGEL, ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT § 211, at 241 (Allen W.
Wood ed., H.B. Nisbet trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1821) (advocating codification in
order to avoid the indeterminacy of the common law); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND
LAWYERS’ REASONINGS 235–98 (1964).
12. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997).
13. 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000).
14. See Masterson v. Sine, 436 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968) (stating more permissive parol evidence
rule); P. Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641 (Cal. 1968)
(stating more permissive rule for introduction of extrinsic evidence to decide ambiguity of term).
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our facts. But inductive reasoning, which in principle is not rivalrous but
merely precedes deductive reasoning, is often regarded as the distinctive
hallmark of common law reasoning. 15 That is, though we might apply a
rule deductively, we infer it in the first place from myriad cases.
Especially in an era of electronic searching on Westlaw and Lexis, we
do not stop with one statement of a legal rule. Rarely does a single
formulation suffice to explain how a case should be handled, at least
those cases that justify the time and attention of commercial litigators. In
order to construct the nuanced formulation a lawyer needs, either for
purposes of advising a client or in briefing to a court, an attorney must
combine elements of the rule gathered from multiple cases, and she must
combine them in the most elegant, logical, and normatively compelling
way.
The usual method by which students learn contract rules is wholly
unlike the manner in which they will acquire more subtle knowledge of
the law later in practice. Although we may have good reason for
proceeding as we do, we do not normally challenge them to extract a
rule from cases but instead identify a case that ostensibly states the rule.
We do not normally challenge them to construct a nuanced version of
the rule from multiple cases; instead we discuss the application of the
formulation offered to precisely those facts from which that formulation
arose.
Consider an analogy to legal rules as formulas that predict (or
determine) points on a graph, points that represent the outcomes of
particular cases. Our usual way of teaching law might suggest that we
use substantive considerations of equity or policy to construct the
formula. We then apply that formula to individual cases. But in reality,
in the practice of law that formula is not constructed from reason alone.
We do not plot points, or determine case outcomes, by applying the
formula to facts. Rather, at any given moment of decision about what the
rule is, we already have thousands of data points but do not agree on the
formula. We draw a line through the data points in order to construct a
formula and then apply that formula to additional inputs—the facts of a
new case—in order to extrapolate from precedent. Using a preselected
set of cases that appears to present fixed and determinate rules distorts
the process of legal reasoning because it makes it look like legal
15. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22–23 (1921) (“The
common law does not work from pre-established truths of universal and inflexible validity to
conclusions derived from them deductively[, but i]ts method is inductive, and it draws its
generalizations from particulars.”); Arthur L. Corbin, What is the Common Law?, 3 AM. L. SCH.
REV. 73, 75 (1912) (describing common law as “creation of law by the inductive process”).
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reasoning consists primarily in the application of a formula to new
inputs, rather than the earlier construction of that formula from existing
data points.
Given time constraints and the risk aversion of first-year law students,
it is difficult to pursue meaningful alternatives to the common core. We
cannot humanely assign them 300 cases from which to extract each legal
rule we expect them to learn—even though that may be what they end
up doing at a law firm. But there are some alternatives we can pursue in
a partial way. First, we can systematically seek out apparently
conflicting cases and ask them to apply the law of both cases (without
choosing between them) to new facts, forcing students to synthesize and
construct rules on their own. Second, we can focus less on the
admittedly important skill of close reading and better cultivate the
equally important skill of skimming. Students often come to class with
each case heavily marked up. Some attempt to memorize the facts, rule,
result and even procedural history of cases. We might lower these
expectations and assign more cases, explicitly instructing them to skim
for the important information. We can use class discussion to help them
understand what they should have looked for, what they should focus on
next time.
Third, we can ask students to argue, either orally or in writing, issues
from two sides. This would highlight for students the malleability of the
law, pushing them to identify the indeterminacies in law and practicing
the all-important skill of persuasion. At present, because our common
core may feed an illusion of determinacy, exercises in legal reasoning
have the quality of explanation. While judges of general jurisdiction
sometimes do need the law explained to them, clients pay more for
effective persuasion, and the development of law depends on a bar that
is capable of helping judges make new law with the best arguments on
either side at hand.
The essential distinction of this Part has been that between inductive
and deductive reasoning in the common law. The next Part will consider
another distinction among legal perspectives on contract, that between
internal and external perspectives on law. Both inductive and deductive
reasoning might be offered within an internal perspective on contract.
Deductive reasoning might be doctrinal or thematic in the way described
earlier, or it might be more normative. We have to try harder to ensure
that students acquire a balanced perspective on the role of inductive and
deductive reasoning in the law, and are able to integrate them in their
practice. Similarly, we must strive to ensure that students come away
with a balance between the internal and external perspectives on law and
assist them in integrating those perspectives over the course of their time
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in law school.
II.

INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL PERSPECTIVES ON
CONTRACT LAW

Internal and external perspectives on law fundamentally differ in the
attitude they assume toward both legal rules and legal practice, and
toward the social activity of contracting.
An internal perspective takes seriously the reasons that actors within
the system give for their own behavior. 16 Internal explanations for
judicial behavior are ones that we can expect judges to accept. For
example, judges might agree that they are more willing to award specific
performance when there is little cost to the court of monitoring
performance. But they would deny that they award remedies based on
the color of plaintiffs’ hair. Even if judges believe that they decide most
cases based on precedent alone, rather than equitable or policy
considerations, judges would still accept reasons cited in internal
perspectives as valid reasons they might in principle invoke.
Similarly, the reasons for legal rules and judicial decision-making
offered in an internal perspective are ones that litigants could reasonably
accept as valid reasons that appropriately bind them. 17 Litigants would
reject a ruling as unfair and “out of bounds” were they to learn, rather
than merely suspect, that the judge had decided based on the prestige of
their respective counsel. But we might expect even the losing party to be
more accepting, rather than more resentful, of her loss if she were told
that the judge had applied a statute, and that a Congressional committee

16. By internal perspective I mean something akin to but less rigorous than what legal
philosophers refer to as “conceptual explanation” or “pragmatism.” I isolate here one element of
their approach, i.e., that a theory’s reasons for legal rules be compatible with the reasons given and
accepted by actors within the legal system. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law:
Groundwork for the Reconciliation of Autonomy and Efficiency, in 1 LEGAL AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, & LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 395–410 (Enrique Villanueva ed., 2002)
(“[C]onceptual explanation” aims “to identify a concept, or set of concepts that render the
phenomena sought to be explained maximally ‘coherent’ [so as to capture its] immanent, inherent,
intrinsic, or internal rationality or intelligibility, deep structure, animating or underwriting
principles, logical consistency, or theoretical or conceptual unity.”); JULES L. COLEMAN, THE
PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 3–12
(2001).
17. The transparency of reasons behind the exercise of state power and the possibility of citizens
accepting those reasons go to the legitimacy of state action. See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS
THOMPSON, WHY DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY? 7 (2004) (describing deliberative democracy as “a
form of government in which free and equal citizens (and their representatives), justify decisions in
a process in which they give one another reasons that are mutually acceptable and generally
accessible”).
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had drafted the relevant provision in order to solve certain observed
problems in commercial contracting. Internal reasons have the mark of
legitimacy because they are open (they do not depend on secrecy for
their efficacy) and they take legal reasoning to be sincere and
transparent.
Legal philosophers have been most deeply committed to
understanding law from this perspective. 18 Especially in private law, but
in public law as well, they take their task to be the illumination and
elaboration of law as we know it, in a way that is recognizable to its
participants. Although philosophers are skeptical, economic legal
reasoning might also be regarded as internal, at least with respect to
contract law. Economists appear more willing to describe legal
reasoning as misguided where it departs from their own; the significance
of their intellectual enterprise does not turn, in their own eyes, on its
correspondence to an existing legal order. Nevertheless, whatever their
skepticism about statutory law, economists are on the whole quite
sanguine about the common law. 19 They believe that the common law
has evolved into a largely efficient body of law. 20 Although they might
describe this as at least in part the product of the invisible hand at work
in legal evolution, the process by which judges respond to market
pressure is one that involves some judicial attention to the efficiencies of
possible rules. In that respect, economists, like philosophers, believe that
the reasons they offer for why one rule might be preferable to another
are the kinds of reasons that interest judges and inevitably interest
socially responsible persons. Their brand of legal reasoning does not
depend on opacity for efficacy, in contrast to external perspectives.
External accounts of contract law are incompatible with the selfunderstanding of participants in the legal system. They reject the reasons
actors give for their own decisions, identifying other social, political,
and economic reasons that are inconsistent with judges’ own accounting.
That inconsistency threatens to be delegitimizing and even destabilizing.
Once the acknowledged reasons for legal decisions fall outside
recognized boundaries, the boundary between law and politics crumbles
and we are left with just another arena for political struggle. In that case
it is not clear what lawyers and legal scholars are doing: are we merely
erecting an elaborate ruse for the exercise of power? If that is the case,
18. See Kraus, supra note 16; COLEMAN, supra note 16.
19. See Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Syndrome of the Efficiency of the Common
Law, 29 B.U. INT’L L.J. 287 (2011) (surveying the legal economic literature on the common law).
20. See Daniel Klerman, Jurisdictional Competition and the Evolution of the Common Law, 74 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1179 (2007) (discussing evolutionary claims in legal economics).
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on what grounds do we expect litigants to abide by judicial decisions?
What guidance can case law have for people deciding how to conduct
their lives and interact with others? Law quickly appears morally
arbitrary and our enterprise less noble than we like to think. The external
perspective might disillusion students at just the moment when they are
eager to learn how to use law as a tool for justice.
Yet arguably only an external perspective allows for deeply critical
analysis of the legal order, as well as the larger social, political, and
economic orders from which it arises and which it in turn supports. Such
critique is all the more essential and powerful when lodged against the
law and social practice of contract, which is the bedrock of a market
economy. Contract law has profound implications for the ordinary
patterns of civil life in a polity, and is the mechanism by which social
resources are allocated among persons. Contract law thus goes to the
heart of essential questions of the political order. We need to ensure
students are equipped with the analytic tools by which to assess that
order from the ground up.
Law professors are often more conservative than their counterparts
elsewhere in the university, perhaps because we are so concerned with
understanding the legal system from the inside out. But lawyers are also
often important agents for political and social reform, and we prepare
our students to perform this important function only when they are able
to step out of the closed system and explain it on terms that, precisely
because they are critical, may not be palatable to insiders.
Two methodologies or approaches to contract law that are decidedly
external are political economy and critical legal studies. What both
methods share, in contrast to dominant approaches to contract law, is a
focus on the distributive consequences of legal rules. The absence of
sustained attention to distribution by prevailing economic and
philosophical theories of contract is not a coincidence. It is facially
presupposed by one of the most notable features of common law
contract: its bilateral structure. That is, in contract disputes one private
person brings a claim against another. Plaintiff does not bring a claim
against “the system,” or the legal order, or the institution of contract.
Plaintiff makes the fairly narrow claim that defendant has breached their
contract. That contract alone is the legal source of the obligation plaintiff
seeks to vindicate—not tort, or moral principles vaguely ensconced in
the law, or other involuntary duties that might frame their commercial
exchange. It takes some theoretical footwork to explain how matters of
institutional justice bear on the bilateral claims that private litigants
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make against each other. 21
How then, do political economy and critical legal studies incorporate
distributive concerns into their explanation of contract doctrine? Neither
method presumes a relationship between bilateral justice and
institutional justice. Both explain rules without presupposing that rules
implement justice at all. Instead, they focus on the motivation of
powerful actors. That is, by showing how rules favor certain groups over
others, they show what reasons winners have for promoting particular
rules, and how the legal system might actually operate as still another
political arena in which familiar winners prevail at the expense of
familiar losers. As I will discuss further below, political economy and
critical legal studies differ in important ways: they do not posit the same
causal mechanisms in their explanations of how power translates into
favorable legal rules. More important, political economy as a method is
not inherently delegitimizing in the way that critical analysis of legal
rules intends to be. Nevertheless, both represent a sharp rebuke to
internal perspectives on the law, accusing internal perspectives of
romantic idealization, or worse, serving as a deluded apologia for the
already powerful. Scholars from an external perspective are in turn
rebuked for deep cynicism, possible paranoia, and most dangerously, a
lack of respect for the normativity of law and its importance to the
project of a rule of law.
Although I have only observed a few contract law professors in the
classroom, my impression is that professors tend to gravitate to either an
internal or an external perspective, based in substantial part on their own
research agendas. This is evident in how professors talk about the
material they teach, the readings they assign, and the kinds of questions
they pose in examinations. Although the sharpest divide may be between
the internal and external perspectives as contrasted here, even within the
internal perspective, legal economists and legal philosophers are
sometimes dismissive of the methodologies and utility of considering
contract from the other’s viewpoint. Given the sincerity with which
professors hold their objections to certain methods, it may be unrealistic
to call upon them to be methodologically agnostic in their teaching.
There is, though, a loss to teaching from one perspective alone. For
teacher-scholars, we miss an opportunity to remain engaged with a
broader range of legal scholarship than we might use in our own writing.
More important, we owe our students a broader perspective than our
21. See Aditi Bagchi, Distributive Justice and Contract, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONTRACT LAW (Greg Klass, George Letsas, & Prince Saprai eds., forthcoming 2014) (arguing that
distributive justice does in fact inform bilateral obligations between litigants).
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own. However erroneous we may deem a particular perspective, it may
be one that resonates with some students more than our own, and helps
them makes sense of the law or their intuitions about it (which may be
critical) more than our own. Just as emphasizing deductive over
inductive methods artificially diminishes the appearance of disagreement
in the law, eschewing perspectives other than our own in teaching
artificially diminishes the appearance of disagreement about the law.
Even if students are, through the heroic efforts of a Registrar, assigned to
first-year professors of a range of methodological proclivities, most will
not be able to apply those methodologies to the material in each class
without some assistance in their first semesters. By the end of their law
school career they may have developed that important intellectual skill:
that is, to be able to hear someone talking about a subject matter from
one perspective and extrapolate rival perspectives on that same subject
matter from the one presented. For that reason, methodological pluralism
is less important in upper-year courses. But in first-year contracts, we
ought to move back and forth between internal and external
perspectives, helping students construct a synthesized, albeit tentative,
perspective that they can revise over the course of their careers.
I will now go through several interdisciplinary perspectives on
contract in greater detail. The aim is to highlight the distinctive value in
each. In addition to philosophy, economics, political economy, and
critical legal studies, each of which I have touched on briefly above, I
will also consider psychology and legal realism as potentially internal
perspectives. Although these methods do not exhaust the array of ways
in which legal scholars today write and think about contract, they cover
a large swath of the relevant range. And although these perspectives in
law may not easily co-exist within the attitudes of individual contract
law professors, I will suggest how we might begin to integrate these into
the perspective we present law students. More important than the
particular method of integration I propose is the imperative to integrate
them in some manner, such that law students are not left with the sense
that these are entirely alternatives to each other, or worse, that the only
legitimate perspective is the one to which they happen to be exposed.
A.

Philosophy

The most important philosophical theory of contract is the promissory
theory. 22 This view of contract is compelling on its face. After all, the
22. See CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
(1981); Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1448 (2004) (arguing
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first section of the Restatement defines contract as “a promise or a set of
promises.” 23 Promises are obligations to particular other persons that we
assume by communicating an intention to do so; so too are contractual
obligations. To be sure, there are problems with the promissory view of
contract but it offers a way of thinking about the moral content of
contractual obligation in a systematic way that can piggyback on a rich
philosophical literature. Contracts as promises invite us to think about
why promises are binding, when they are binding and when they are not,
when their breach gives rise to a remedial duty, and what the
relationship should be between the moral obligations that attend promise
and the legal obligations recognized by contract law. These questions
nicely track many of the key questions in contract. For example, if
contractual commitments are promises, why do we enforce promises that
are made in exchange for consideration, or those that give rise to
reliance, but not others? Why must a promise be accepted to become
contractual? In interpreting obligations, why does objective intent
prevail over subjective intent? What are the conditions under which we
are morally excused from voluntary obligations, and are those conditions
the ones under which we should be legally excused? What remedial
obligations arise after breach of an ordinary promise, and how do those
inform our liability upon breach of a legally binding agreement?
Although it is possible to offer a cohesive account of contract law
without systematically engaging these moral questions, treating
questions of contract to be in part questions about promise gives students
an accessible and systematic way to consider essential features of
common law contract.
There are alternatives to the promissory theory within the
philosophical perspective. Consent theory, championed by Randy
Barnett, focuses on what justifies state enforcement of contract, with no
presumption that moral obligations per se justify legal liability. 24
Contrasting the promissory and consent theories of contract is a good
way to tap students’ own intuitions about the relationship between law
and morality.
Other philosophical approaches abound. What they have in common
is that they take seriously the moral language in cases, in which legal
liability seems contingent on moral responsibility. More so than any
that “[c]ontract presents a special case of promise” and that contract is a “class of promises”); Jody
S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract and Promise, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1603 (2009); Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708 (2007).
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).
24. Randy Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986).
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other interdisciplinary perspective, philosophy of law self-consciously
aspires to offer an account of contract that resonates with case law
reasoning and the style of argument in which ordinary litigants engage.
Private law is distinctively moralistic in its tone, vocabulary, and
structure. Whatever its limitations, the philosophical perspective makes
more sense of contract law as know it, read it, and practice it than any
other. It would be difficult to teach cases without engaging in at least
some casual philosophical talk but even contract law teachers disinclined
to pursue this literature in depth could use the analytic rigor of
philosophical analysis to improve the rigor of in-class legal reasoning
and to show students that law is intimately related to other areas of
moral life with which they are already familiar.
B.

Economics

Economic analysis of law has become dominant in contract
scholarship. Even legal scholars not formally trained in economics use
the basic concepts and vocabulary of law and economics. Those who
make recommendations that are at odds with traditional economic
analysis feel compelled to offer explanation for their deviance. The
intellectual dominance of economic thinking in the American legal
academy—though not outside it—is sufficient reason for us to take
economic analysis of law seriously. Judges and policymakers are
increasingly attentive to economic analysis. 25 To ensure that students
can argue persuasively to these audiences, we must ensure that our
students are minimally proficient in it.
But there is more to be said on behalf of legal economics than that.
Putting behavioral economics aside for the moment, economics tends to
assume that people are rational and pursue their material self-interest.
The literature implies or argues that courts should be welfaremaximizing, and it implicitly or explicitly assumes that wealth
maximization is a legitimate proxy for welfare maximization by liberal
courts. 26 These assumptions may be flawed, but they capture deep
strands in liberal thinking about the appropriate attitude of the law. If the
25. See, for example, courts’ use of economic analysis in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20–
21 (1997) (antitrust); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (review of SEC
regulation); National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 2566,
2613–20 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act); Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (copyright).
26. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common
Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics,
and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1979).
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philosophical literature taps into our intuition that the legal responsibility
has something to do with moral responsibility, even if the former cannot
be equated with the latter, the economic literature taps into our intuition
that the law must usually take us as we are, and that it cannot and should
not attempt to paint too fine a portrait of its subject. Whether we are in
fact rational, we might wish the state to assume that we are. Whether we
are in fact moved by considerations other than the pursuit of wealth, we
might prefer a contract law that facilitates collective wealth
maximization rather than other more personal goals that we
differentially value, and for which we may not wish to engage the
support of state institutions. Support of a market economy is at least
among the essential functions of contract law, and economic analysis is
critical to understanding how rules perform that function.
Students who identify with progressive politics sometimes resist legal
economics. But this resistance is misguided and worth challenging
gently. Although legal economists might tend to take wealth
maximization as a policy goal, whatever our policy ends, economic
analysis helps us understand how to operate the lever that is contract
law, in order to achieve our policy goals. For example, students
committed to more equitable distribution of material resources might
resist the idea that contract rules should be designed to maximize
transactional surplus without attention to how that surplus is distributed
between the parties. Similarly, they might reject economists’ rejection of
bargaining power (at the time of contract) as usually irrelevant; some
students would instead use law to correct for imbalances of bargaining
power. Without suggesting that there is a definitive answer to questions
of this type, students that wish to steer the law in another direction need
to understand the ways in which rules can be expected to alter outcomes,
or not. They need to understand the relationship between rules,
contracting behavior, and micro and macro outcomes. Only then can
they plausibly use rules to promote outcomes different from the ones
they now observe.
C.

Psychology
There has been a surge in recent work in the psychology of contract. 27

27. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY
CONSUMER MARKETS (2012); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Do
Liquidated Damages Encourage Breach? A Psychological Experiment, 108 MICH. L. REV. 633
(2010); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Baron, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach
of Contract, 6 J. EMP. LEG. STUD. 405 (2009). See generally Russell Korobkin, Daniel Kahneman’s

IN
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That work has been offered as a corrective to both philosophical and
economic accounts of contract law. Philosophical theory often proceeds
as if we all share common intuitions about the morality of promise,
agreement, and contract itself. Such starting assumptions are necessary
and usually resonate with enough people, and with enough of the case
law, to justify the effort of drawing out the moral implications of those
assumptions. But empirical studies in psychology that directly inquire
about people’s views of moral obligation are important to tethering
moral-philosophical analysis of contract. 28
Behavioral psychology has also fathered a whole area within
economics: behavioral economics. Scholars working in behavioral
economics show how the assumptions in economic models are often
misguided, and justify legal rules that may not be justified on a more
realistic model of human behavior. Especially because consent is critical
to philosophical and economic analyses of contract, psychological
insights about the severe limitations to the quality of our consent under
various circumstances should lead us to question how much of our legal
rules we want to rest on assumptions about robust consent, and to search
out alternative grounds for legitimacy. 29 This will be especially
important in the context of standard form contracts, or other contracts
involving persons who are unlikely to read and understand the terms of
their agreements.
Rethinking the psychological assumptions in other theories of
contract is a valuable payoff from attention to the psychology of
contract. But that literature has another, more subtle payoff as well. The
subject of contract law is a highly abstracted contracting party. For the
most part, the move from status to contract entailed deliberate
inattention to features of particular parties. We do not want to know too
much about a person’s situation in life in the context of adjudicating
contracts, we might think, because we risk having their entitlements in
contract law turn on social facts that judges are poorly situated to
determine and to which they will assign inconsistent and inappropriate
significance.

Influence on Legal Theory, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1349 (2013).
28. See Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Legal Promise and Psychological Contract, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 843 (2012); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L.
REV. 1003 (2010).
29. See Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203 (2003); see also Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H.
Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty,
106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1053–54 (2012).
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Although we do not want to lift the veil on the contracting subject
completely, nor do we want the presumed subject of contract law to
depart too radically—or at least, arbitrarily—from natural persons as we
know them (or corporations, as we know them to operate under the
control of natural persons). To the extent philosophical presumptions
about persons depart from the reality of our cognitive processes, moral
theorizing about contract might be irrelevant to persons with our actual
capacities. To the extent economists presume persons to operate more
rationally than they do, or define rationality in ways that do not
correspond to even our idealized behavior, economists will no longer
shed light on how legal rules relate to behavior and outcomes.
This is not to say that philosophers and economists should be limited
to discussing only what we flawed people, with our actual messy
psychologies do or can do. But we must be careful when our
assumptions about the subject of contract law depart from natural
persons. We might have good reason to depart: because we wish the
state to respect autonomy in persons even if they are not capable of
exercising it, or because we wish to hold persons responsible for choices
even where we would not have expected them to choose differently. But
artificial assumptions, though they may be justified, should be made
consciously. Psychological perspectives on contract force us to do that.
D.

Legal Realism

Unlike the other perspectives considered thus far, legal realism is a
perspective homegrown within law schools, not imported from other
departments in the university. In some ways, we need not worry that this
perspective might not get its due in a particular classroom. It was so
influential that “we are all legal realists now.” 30
But though we may now all aspire to be “realistic” about the law,
legal realism had some more subtle insights that could be overlooked, or
at least, not conveyed to students. Part I focused on the fact of
indeterminacy in the law. Legal realism made this feature central.31 It
emphasized the open-endedness of doctrine and the inevitability of
30. Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465, 467 (1988) (reviewing
LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960 (1986)); see also Gary Peller, The
Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1985).
31. See Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 52–53 (Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005);
Hanoch Dagan, The Realist Conception of Law, 57 U. TORONTO L.J. 607, 607–10 (2007); John
Hasnas, Back to the Future: From Critical Legal Studies Forward to Legal Realism, or How Not to
Miss the Point of the Indeterminacy Argument, 45 DUKE L.J. 84 (1995).
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lawmaking by common law judges. 32 Interestingly, it did not take this
exercise of authority to be de-legitimizing. To the contrary, though legal
realists were skeptical about scholarly talk about the law, they were
rather optimistic about the law itself. In particular, the fact-driven
process of adjudication makes possible, on this view, legal evolution that
keeps pace with changing social facts. Legal realism eschews the
formality of philosophical and economic models that would have
doctrine turn (in most cases) on apparently eternal “facts” about the
moral structure of agreement, or dynamics of bargaining and market
behavior. Although neither philosophy nor economics expressly rests on
obviously unattractive claims about the irrelevance of social facts,
neither is focused on the contingent nature of their theories of contract.
Legal realism sees law as responsive to social fact, and for the better.
Two opposing schools of thought about contract in particular might
be seen to stress the core insight of legal realism. First, relational theory
claims that contract law should take better account of the social
relationships that accompany the legal relation of contract. 33 Social facts,
especially the social norms that govern those relationships, should be
incorporated into judicial decision-making. Relationalists are associated
with the view that the law should support the norms of private
relationships by enforcing them, or recognizing them by interpreting
contractual obligations in their light and offering remedies that take into
account the impact on the underlying relationship. 34 As legal realists
would, relationalists sometimes suggest that judges already take into
account the norms of contractual relationships; they advocate that they
do this more explicitly and systematically.
On the other side, formalists eschew such calls for contextualism. But
they do so on reasoning that is also realist, in that they too think that the
manner of contract interpretation pursued by courts should depend on
social facts about commercial contracting. 35 Formalists in contract
theory argue that judges should sharply limit the evidence they hear
about context and restrict themselves to plain meaning because parties
draft agreements with that expectation, and would not want judges to

32. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 267, 275 (1997).
33. See Ian R. Macneil, Relational Contract Theory: Challenges and Queries, 94 NW. U. L. REV.
877, 881–82 (2000).
34. Id. at 900.
35. See Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual
Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1023 (2009); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation
Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926 (2010).
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engage in guessing games about which norms parties wished to enforce,
and which they did not. 36 Thus, formalists in contract also justify their
position with respect to the social practice of contracting and the
interaction between interpretive rules and contract design.
Most professors of contract law probably spend some time talking
about the choice between contextualist and formalist interpretation, as
that choice corresponds to jurisdictional differences in the rules
pertaining to parol evidence and the admissibility of extrinsic evidence.
Noting the lessons of legal realism expressly casts that debate in an
interesting light. Its call for responsiveness to social fact highlights
empirical questions about how contract operates on the ground, the
preferences of contracting parties, and the capacity of judges to be
responsive to those preferences on a case-by-case basis.
I include legal realism as an internal perspective here because, as
argued above, inductive reasoning that extends precedent to the facts in
particular cases in ways that are not wholly determined by any single,
authoritative formulation of a legal rule is at the heart of the common
law model. It is not, nor did legal realists perceive it to be, a dirty secret
about the common law. They did not claim, after all, that legal rules do
no work, only that they mediate between past and new cases and that it
would be a mistake for observers of the legal system to reify what
insiders know to be flexible and evolving. In our teaching, it is useful to
highlight the insights of legal realists and thereby caution against
accidental assumptions about legal process that we now generally reject
upon reflection.
E.

Critical Legal Studies

Critical legal studies is sometimes spoken of in the past tense, but
arguably it too so successfully permeated legal discourse that we are, to
some extent, all crits now. It has been the most important fully external
perspective on the law to receive sustained attention.
Like legal realists, critical legal theorists are skeptical of claims about
the law’s formal purity. 37 But though these empty formalisms may be
indeterminate in themselves, critical theorists do not view the law as
ultimately indeterminate. To the contrary, the ideological power
structures that manifest in legal doctrine may be quite predictable. Law
is, after all, not a bubble within which judges and other lawmakers are
36. Kraus & Scott, supra note 35; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 35.
37. See Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV.
561, 564 (1983).
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shielded from politics. Powerful groups in society—whether those are
defined by wealth, race, or sex—use the law to perpetuate their
hegemony. 38 The normative justifications to which the law appeals
distract us from the best explanation for legal rules and the political
consciousness and mobilization that we need to make them more just.
That is, at least, the heart of critical legal theorists’ claims. They add
politics and power to the legal realist narrative. In so doing, critical
theorists make legal theory considerably more realistic—and biting.
Some critical legal studies in contract have been more successful than
others in shifting prevailing views of contract. Duncan Kennedy’s Form
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication and his Distributive and
Paternalist Motives in Contract 39 have both been highly influential.
They are widely cited even by those unsympathetic to his politics. 40
Scholarship focusing on class and the ways in which law develops and is
applied to the material advantage of the lawmaking class has been wellreceived relative to other critical work, even if operates as a reality
check on the classical view of contract rather than a substitute for it.
Critical work on sex and race in contract has operated as a less
consistent corrective. On the one hand, casebooks do sometimes include
a note or reference an article that deconstructs a case from the
perspective of sex. Deconstruction from the vantage of sexual politics
may be especially productive in the context of Lumley v. Wagner, 41
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 42 or Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc. 43
Some professors might reference race in the context of disparate pricing
or the relationship between racial experience and preferences for
formality in contracting. 44 But it is unclear how much time professors
38. See Robert W. Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A
PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281, 286 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race,
Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1351–52 (1988); Duncan Kennedy, Antonio Gramsci and the Legal System, 6
ALSA F. 32, 32 (1982); Douglas Litowitz, Gramsci, Hegemony, and the Law, 2000 BYU L. REV.
515.
39. Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort Law, with
Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563
(1982); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685 (1976).
40. See William Fisher, Introduction to Duncan Kennedy, in THE CANON OF AMERICAN LEGAL
THOUGHT 647, 650–57 (David Kennedy & William W. Fisher III eds., 2006).
41. (1852) 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch.) 693 (availability of specific performance for personal service
contracts).
42. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917).
43. 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (contract voidable for undue influence).
44. Some articles on race and contract include Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race
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spend on these casebook asides in class. Without classroom time, it is
unclear how seriously students take these issues. Even professors
unpersuaded that deconstructive accounts are accurate would do well to
challenge their students to think through them. For many students, the
sexual and racial biases of the law are intuitive and potentially
delegitimizing; professors who fail to acknowledge them risk leaving
those students vaguely skeptical and silent. But quite possibly the
students who need to hear it the most are those for whom deconstruction
is entirely alien and unintuitive. Professors should challenge those
students to defend their priors against the skepticism of their peers.
F.

Political Economy

Political economy is a rich social science as housed in political
science departments, but it is only sporadically used in legal scholarship.
Two kinds of political economy are worth distinguishing.
First, there is the branch of legal economic scholarship that concerns
judicial behavior and its determinants. 45 That literature uses institutional
features, such as judicial elections, tenure or partisanship to predict
judicial outcomes. Although it tends to rely disproportionately on
evidence from Supreme Court decision-making, it makes more general
claims about judicial motivation. For obvious reasons, such a

Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L. REV. 817, 819 (1991) (disparate pricing);
Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of its Cause,
94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1995) (same); Anthony R. Chase, Race, Culture, and Contract Law:
From the Cottonfield to the Courtroom, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1 (1995) (meta-discourse); Anne-Marie
G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases of Consumer Racial
Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1, 4 (2003) (disparate pricing); Emily M.S. Houh, Critical
Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract
Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (2002) (good faith doctrine); Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical
Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 401 (1987)
(on formality).
45. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET. AL., ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and
Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L. J.
2155 (1998); Stephen M. Feldman, The Rule of Law or the Rule of Politics? Harmonizing the
Internal and External Views of Supreme Court Decision Making, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 89
(2005); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, The Evolution of Common Law, 115 J. POL. ECON. 43
(2007); Timothy R. Johnson, Information, Oral Arguments, and Supreme Court Decision Making,
29 AM. POL. RES. 331 (2001); Eric Rasmusen, Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game, 10 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 63 (1994); Theodore W. Ruger et al., The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal
and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L.
REV. 1150 (2004); Frederick Schauer, Incentives, Reputation, and the Inglorious Determinants of
Judicial Behavior, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 615 (2000); Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the
Results of Rhetoric: Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371 (1995).
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perspective is deeply incompatible with the self-understanding of
participants. Nevertheless, this external check on our assumptions about
the neutrality of institutional design should inform more deliberate
construction of institutions to promote the kind of judicial behavior we
prefer; or at least, it should chasten those who would speak too naively
about legal process.
There is a less cohesive but arguably still more important type of
political economic work about the law. I refer to scholarship on various
aspects of contract regulation that shows how interest group
constellations promote or preserve particular pieces of legislation. For
example, there has been work on the regulation of mortgages and
consumer finance. 46 This work is reminiscent of critical legal studies
except that instead of focusing on the role of ideology, it details the ways
in which political processes determine legal content. As statutory law,
even in the law governing private exchange, comes to overshadow the
common law, such political economic accounts become more important.
As law schools make deliberate efforts to train students to read and
apply statutes, educating students about the dynamics of regulation in a
fundamental area like contract will both give them a broader view of
contract law and its sources, and also prepare them for similar analysis
of legislation in other areas.
CONCLUSION
Internal perspectives on law dominate in the classroom, and for good
reason—though the result is not necessarily a good one. We have good
reason to privilege the internal perspective of the law because law school
is the only place, outside of practice, where students can acquire this
perspective. It is the one they need to inhabit when they practice.
However, the aggregate result is less obviously favorable. Although
individual students need to be trained in the internal perspective in order
to be effective lawyers, they need to be exposed systematically to the
external perspective in order to develop sophisticated and complete
professional identities, and in order to be the agents of political change
and reform that lawyers have traditionally been. External perspectives
are important to professional identity because lawyers need to do more

46. See Atif Mian, Amir Sufi & Francesco Trebbi, The Political Economy of the US Mortgage
Default Crisis, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 1967, 1997 (2010); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 591 (2002);
Edward L. Rubin, Legislative Methodology: Some Lessons from the Truth-in-Lending Act, 80 GEO.
L.J. 233 (1991).
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than navigate the law; at the end of the day, they need to be able to
situate themselves in society. For work to be intellectually and
personally satisfying, they must be able to account for their own role.
They cannot do this without ever stepping back and critically assessing
the claims the law makes on its own behalf. And without taking that step
back, they will not be able to effectively identify the minor and major
changes that will improve the law, and the social order of which it is an
essential part.
Some law students come out of their first year feeling a bit
schizophrenic, having been taken back and forth between internal and
external perspectives in various courses. This is surely better than having
wandered through their first year with a naively simplistic view of the
law. But it does not necessarily follow from the methodologically
pluralistic approach recommended here. In principle, we should try not
just to offer multiple perspectives to our students but also to help them
integrate those perspectives.
For example, we might spend some precious class time on the
question of which causal explanations for legal content undermine
legitimacy, and which can be reconciled with internal accounts. Political
economic accounts of legislation usually seem to be intended to
delegitimize the law in question; but we might just as well embrace the
politics that underlie law as the concrete form that democracy takes. We
might think that democratic production of law, even in the indirect case
of judge-made law in the common law, will be responsive to the policy
considerations that economists advocate, or the moral considerations on
which legal philosophers dwell. Law may be over-determined, in that
more than one explanation for it exists; even as we come to appreciate it
as a contingent object of deep disagreement.
There is more than one way to make sense of the apparently
competing truths of multiple perspectives. However one proceeds, the
project of integration is essential because the distinctive perspective of
law on contract is precisely the integrated one. We must do more than
individually translate scholarship in other fields that pertain to law, or
even apply their methods to subject matter with which lawyers are
especially adept. After translation comes integration. It is imperative that
we undertake that in our teaching, even where our writing adopts a
particular view.
For while integration in legal scholarship may take place over the
course of a literature without deliberate management, it is more likely to
take hold in the mind of a law student with the assistance of her
instructor. If each law student were to have each core class taught by
someone of a distinct methodology, we might leave to students the task
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of integration. But in first-year courses, this is a tall order. Few students
are lucky enough to draw such a diverse range of first-year professors,
and many would not attempt to synthesize a perspective of their own—
especially when unchallenged to do so. Whatever our individual slant on
contract, it is incumbent on us to at least help our students with this
process of integration.

